VEB vragen in de AVA 2022

1. What will SBM Offshore do (differently) to finally unlock value and structurally increase TSR?

2. Has SBM Offshore been approached by parties suggesting being taken over or taken private?

3. With the news that HAL wants to take over Boskalis, has SBM Offshore checked whether HAL may have similar plans with SBM Offshore?

4. Why doesn’t SBM Offshore aim for buying back many more shares, or does it consider the current share price to reasonably reflect its true value?

5. How does SBM Offshore determine whether buying back shares is the best way of allocating cash?

6. Do shareholders have to prepare for more fines, relating Angola or any other country?

7. Can SBM Offshore confirm that all legacy compliance issues have now been finally resolved and that a solid compliance framework has been well embedded within SBM Offshore?

8. To what degree does SBM Offshore expect to be impacted by additional supply chain issues, or does it expect that the mitigation efforts during the COVID-pandemic are sufficient?

9. To what extent does SBM Offshore have pricing power, i.e. is it likely that cost inflation will hurt margins?

10. Can the Supervisory Board elaborate on the discussions with the Management Board on how to finally unlock value and structurally increase TSR?

11. Has the Supervisory Board considered asking for outside (strategic) advice on how to unlock value?

12. Does the Supervisory Board consider the lagging share price of SBM Offshore to be an issue?

13. Mrs. Ingelise Arntsen list of mandates is long and she seems to be overboarded. How does the Supervisory Board ensure that she dedicates enough time and energy to SBM Offshore?

14. Many companies are struggling to find competent female directors. Was that a compelling reason for SBM Offshore to be more lenient and accept a director with so many mandates?

15. VEB disagrees with (the implementation of) a remuneration policy where the LTI (Value Creation Stake) is almost automatically granted (1.75 base salaries, excluding share price movements). There are no challenging performance criteria, except obvious “underpins” like serious safety, impairments or compliance Is SBM Offshore willing to consider changing its policy in order to include challenging performance criteria for granting Value Creating Stake shares?

16. Can SBM Offshore confirm that the changes relating to the payment for Protective Preference Shares are likely to be in the best interest of shareholders?

17. Why is Erik Lagendijk resigning from the Board and/or not being put forward for re-appointment?

18. Is it related to any legacy or new compliance issues with SBM Offshore?

1. Is het mogelijk om Energy Storage, dat nu nog maar 7% van de totale omzet uitmaakt, in een van de andere twee segmenten te schuiven en vervolgens wel de winst over deze segmenten te rapporteren?

2. Kan Alfen aangeven wat de redenen zijn van het achterblijven van de groei in Energy Storage over de afgelopen vier jaar? Wat is het perspectief van deze divisie op de lange termijn?

3. De omzet groeide in 2021 voor het tweede jaar op rij minder hard dan de middellange termijndoelstelling van 40%. Nu zou 2021 voor Alfen, net als voor veel andere bedrijven, een goed jaar moeten kunnen zijn. In welk segment zit in de visie van het bestuur de grootste teleurstelling als we kijken naar omzetgroei?

4. Alfen heeft een substantiële netto-kaspositie die niet nodig lijkt te zijn voor het financieren van autonome groei. Wat is de rationale voor Alfen om deze kaspositie aan te houden?

5. Waar de cashconversie in 2020 sterk was, was deze vorig boekjaar Het netto-werkkapitaal verdrievoudigde naar ruim naar 32 miljoen euro ultimo 2021, vooral omdat substantieel hogere voorraden werden aangehouden. Moeten aandeelhouders rekening houden met een significant hoger werkkapitaalbeslag in de komende jaren?

6. Andere (beursgenoteerde) ondernemingen hebben uitgesproken dat het risico bestaat dat op korte termijn de productie mogelijk moet worden gestaakt vanwege verstoringen in de toeleveringsketen. Hoe groot is dit risico voor Alfen?

7. Alfen heeft met de groei van de onderneming een professionaliseringsslag Tot op heden heeft Alfen echter geen interne audit dienst en is er geen aparte audit commissie binnen de raad van commissarissen. Kan Alfen toelichten waarom het dit niet nodig acht? Op welke wijze borgen bestuur en commissarissen dat de interne controle meegroeit met de omvang en complexiteit van de onderneming?

8. Ten aanzien van de korte termijn bonus (short term incentive, STI) was voor 2021 een ‘at target’ doelstelling van kracht voor het criterium omzetgroei van 30,5% ten opzichte van 2020. Tegelijkertijd is de middellange termijn doelstelling die de onderneming naar beleggers communiceert 40% omzetgroei per jaar. Kan Alfen dit significante verschil in doelstellingen voor de groep en de beloning toelichten?

9. In de outlook 2022 geeft Alfen aan een omzet te verwachten van tussen de 330 miljoen en 370 miljoen euro. Kan de raad van commissarissen aangeven wat de minimum, ‘at target’ en maximum drempels zijn voor het korte termijn bonuscriterium ‘omzet’ voor boekjaar 2022?

10. Meent de accountant dat de huidige segmentrapportage in lijn is met de boekhoudregels van IFRS en kan de accountant bij het antwoord op deze vraag inzicht geven in de discussies hieromtrent met het bestuur en de raad van commissarissen?

11. PwC meldt als frauderisico te hebben aangemerkt de ‘management override of control’. Het risico op het doorbreken van interne beheersing door het management is een risico dat verondersteld wordt aanwezig te zijn bij elke controle.

Welke hoog-risico boekingen heeft PwC in dit kader geselecteerd, en op basis van welke risico-inschatting is dat gebeurd? Wat waren de conclusies?

12. PwC geeft ook aan ‘specific audit activities’ op deze hoog-risico boekingen te hebben verricht. Waaruit bestonden die werkzaamheden en wat waren de conclusies?

13. Kan Alfen toelichten welke drie bedrijven uit de ‘peer group’ voor de beloning zijn verwijderd? En tevens aangeven welke drie bedrijven daarvoor in de plaats zijn gekomen?

14. Kan Alfen toelichten of het bezoldigingsbeleid dat bij dit agendapunt wordt voorgelegd voor de komende jaren zal volstaan, of dat aandeelhouders er rekening mee moeten houden dat het beleid op korte termijn wederom zal worden herzien?

1. Eind vorig jaar heeft NSI de business case voor drie grote projecten geactualiseerd (Laanderpoort, Vitrum en Vivaldi III). Uitkomst van die analyse is dat NSI ten aanzien van de drie projecten een yield on cost (YOC) van 5,5 procent Bij de berekeningen is rekening gehouden met een hogere inflatie en langere doorlooptijd van de projecten dan eerder aangenomen.

a. Kan NSI voor elk van de drie projecten de verwachte YOC delen met aandeelhouders, alsmede de YOC die één (april 2021) en twee (april 2020) jaar gelden werd verwacht?

b. Hoe reëel acht NSI het risico dat de YOC op korte termijn (verder) verlaagd moet worden, bijvoorbeeld omdat de hoge inflatie hardnekkiger blijkt dan nu aangenomen?

c. Is een rendement van 5,5 procent wel voldoende gezien de substantiele risico’s van deze projecten in de huidige (markt)omstandigheden?

d. Kan NSI de drie projecten nog annuleren, en zo ja, welke kosten zouden daaraan verbonden zijn?

2. NSI geeft in het jaarverslag aan dat het de segmentrapportage gaat veranderen. Een gevolg hiervan is dat aandeelhouders vanaf volgend boekjaar geen inzicht meer krijgen in de (financiële) prestaties van de HNK-objecten.

a. HNK is een belangrijk onderdeel van de strategie van Kan NSI in dit kader toelichten waarom het voornemens is minder informatie te delen over HNK?

b. Kan NSI toezeggen dat het de komende jaren de (meest) relevante informatie ten aanzien van de HNK-objecten blijft delen met aandeelhouders?

3. De gemiddelde looptijd van de uitstaande schulden van NSI bedroeg ultimo vorig jaar 4,9 jaar. Dat was in 2020 5,2 jaar.

a. Waarom heeft NSI de gemiddelde looptijd van de schulden (juist) niet verlengd ten opzichte van vorig jaar?

b. Is het gezien de (verwachte) ontwikkeling van de rente niet verstandig en prudent om de looptijden van de leningen op korte termijn te verlengen?

4. Het aantal FTE’s is verder opgelopen tot 56 ultimo vorig jaar (2020: 50 FTE). Vorig jaar gaf NSI in de AVA aan dat personeel dat voorheen werd ingehuurd in dienst is genomen.

a. Kan NSI toelichten waarvoor het extra personeel nodig is?

b. Kan NSI aangeven of het huidige aantal FTE volstaat, of dat een verdere groei in FTE’s voorzien is?

5. In de outlook geeft NSI aan dat het huurindexatie verwacht van tussen de 3 en 4 procent omdat ‘bijna alle leases zijn geïndexeerd op CPI..’. Is deze indexatie wel voldoende om NIS te compenseren voor de geldontwaarding?

6. Veel beursgenoteerde Nederlandse vastgoedfondsen kijken naar mogelijkheden om residentieel vastgoed te ontwikkelen in of rondom objecten in hun Ziet NSI hier ook mogelijkheden toe?

7. Het saldo ‘Niet doorbelaste servicekosten’ was hoger dan in 2020. Vorig boekjaar werd aangegeven dat dit hogere saldo een gevolg was van covid-19 maatregelen, voornamelijk in het HNK-segment. Nu ontbreekt een toelichting. Kan NSI deze toelichting alsnog geven?

8. PricewaterhouseCoopers meldt als frauderisico te hebben aangemerkt de ‘management override of control’.

a. Waarom heeft de accountant zijn bevindingen niet in de controleverklaring vermeld?

b. Welke hoog-risico boekingen heeft PricewaterhouseCoopers geselecteerd, en op basis van welke risico-inschatting is dat gebeurd? Wat waren de conclusies?

9. Ondanks de kritische houding van stemadviesbureaus en aanzienlijke oppositie in de AVA vorig jaar agendeert NSI – in tegenstelling tot sommige andere vastgoedfondsen – opnieuw een voorstel waarin om goedkeuring wordt gevraagd om aandelen uit te geven zonder voorkeursrecht.

a. Meent NSI dat verkrijging van dit mandaat van aandeelhouders cruciaal is om de strategie uit te kunnen voeren?

b. Is de urgentie voor NSI van het verkrijgen van dit mandaat ten opzichte van vorig jaar toegenomen?

Stemverklaring De VEB is kritisch op het door NSI gevraagde mandaat om tot 20 procent van het aandelenkapitaal uit te kunnen geven voor een periode van 18 maanden zonder een voorkeursrecht te geven aan bestaande aandeelhouders. Door de stevige disagio van het aandeel zal het verwaterende effect van een eventuele emissie substantieel zijn waardoor het een grote uitdaging wordt voldoende rendement op het opgehaalde kapitaal te maken voor aandeelhouders. Gezien de huidige onderwaardering op de beurs ten aanzien van de intrinsieke waarde lijkt het logischer om in plaats van aandelen uitgeven aandelen in te kopen. Desalniettemin apprecieert de VEB de uitgebreide toelichting van NSI bij agendapunt 10.b waarin wordt onderbouwd waarom het emissiemandaat in het belang zou zijn van de onderneming, en haar stakeholders. Ook heeft de VEB begrip voor het standpunt van NSI om voldoende flexibiliteit na te streven waarmee eventuele opportunische M&A mogelijk wordt in de huidige marktomstandigheden. Derhave zal de VEB gegeven die omstandigheden dit jaar ‘voor’ de voorstellen onder agendapunt 10 stemmen. De VEB wil NSI wel uitdrukkelijk verzoeken prudent om te gaan met dit mandaat, en roept op hier alleen van gebruik te maken in uitzonderlijke omstandigheden waarin het uitgangspunt moet zijn dat het verwachte rendement op het opgehaalde kapitaal hoger moet liggen dan de kostenvoet van kapitaal. Ook dient de korting op de aandelen bij een onderhandse plaatsting redelijk te zijn. In een persbericht dient NSI adequaat en uitputtend een onderhandse emissie te motiveren.

1. Wolters Kluwer has made significant progress in shifting from the declining print- publishing model to a digital model. This improved the sustainability of the company and an improved operating margin above 25 percent. To what degree has this shift exposed the company to more competition from disruptors?

2. Today Wolters Kluwer’s business model is primarily (80 percent of total revenue) based on subscriptions, software maintenance, and other recurring revenues. As a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine global recession risks have increased. To what degree would a recession impact revenue and earnings of Wolters Kluwer?

3. Wolters Kluwer has previously remarked that customers want to reduce the number of suppliers and prefer products that work together. In which business division(s) does Wolters Kluwer see the biggest opportunities to improve its current product portfolio in order to improve its market position?

4. In an industry that is characterized by high retention rates (including competitors like Thomson Reuters and RELX), cross-selling to existing customers is very important. How much more products is Wolters Kluwer able to sell to its existing customer base to drive its organic revenue growth?

5. Wolters Kluwer announced a new three-year strategy with several strategic priorities. At first look, it looks very similar to the previous strategy. What would you point to as the notable changes that impact investors?

6. Many listed companies in recent months were impacted by inflation ranging from higher commodity prices to higher wages. What financial impact does inflation (such as wage inflation) have on Wolters Kluwer, and to what degree are you able to absorb these cost increases by charging higher prices?

7. Wolters Kluwer continues to believe that in the long run a net debt/EBITDA ratio of around 2.5 times is appropriate due to the high proportion of recurring revenues and resilient cash flow. What catalyst would be required to move towards that leverage target?

8. Deloitte identified ‘management override of controls’ as a fraud risk. The risk of overriding internal controls is supposed to be present in every audit. Can Deloitte provide examples of high risk journal entries that were identified and examined?

9. In what specific ways do the audit procedures performed with respect to this fraud risk (‘management override of controls’) differ from the audit procedures performed in the context of the key audit matters ‘revenue recognition’ and ‘internal controls over financial reporting’?

10. In our opinion the rationale for the proposed amendment would benefit from a more meaningful explanation. In the explanatory notes to the agenda the supervisory board mentions in particular a review performed of remuneration levels at other Dutch (AEX) listed companies and selected European companies. What endogenous factors, e.g. Wolters Kluwer specific arguments, were considered?

1. Heineken’s net revenue per hectoliter trailed movements in direct costs (incl. raw materials, packaging) per hectoliter. Thereby gross margin per hectoliter (excl. marketing) has declined. What will Heineken do to improve gross margin over the next few years?

HEINEKEN has been significant impacted by the pandemic, reflected in a loss of volume and an adverse channel and packaging mix. The loss of on trade volume with higher revenue per hectoliter and lower variable cost per hectoliter has been particularly challenging, and a big driver of the effect the VEB notes. HEINEKEN has also been impacted by significant inflation in its input costs and by transactional currency effects from the devaluation of emerging market currencies versus the euro. As restrictions from governments have lifted, HEINEKEN has been assertive in its pricing and aims to upset these inflationary pressures in an absolute basis or as we say, euro per euro. This was visible in the 2nd half of 2021, in our Q1 trading update from yesterday and will continue to be our means to protect gross margin going forward.

2. In 2018 Heineken, in relation to the acquisition of Kirin Brasil, remarked that it would be able to increase margins in Brazil to the Group-average over a period of three to five years. In light of declined margins at competitor Ambev’s Brazilian activities over the past three years what does Heineken foresee going forward?

Our original ambition of bringing margins to group-average level in Brazil has not been achieved yet. This is due to several reasons but a major one is the devaluation of c.100% of the Brazilian Real over the past 5 years. We have taken enormous steps to improve the profitability of our business in Brazil, particularly (1) capturing significant synergies from the Kirin acquisition and improving productivity with EverGreen, (2) executing a massive reconversion of our portfolio from lower margin soft drinks and economy beer to premium beer and brands and from soft-drinks to beer and (3) transitioning brands Heineken® and Amstel to our own route-to-consumer to accelerate our growth in higher margin returnable packaging in the on-trade. Improving the profitability of our business in Brazil remains a top priority into the future.

3. Last year Heineken obtained control of United Breweries Limited (UBL) in India. The operating margin of UBL in India has historically been substantially lower than Heineken Group (especially Asia-Pacific). Is Heineken able to share what the potential for margin expansion is in India?

At the time of the acquisition, HEINEKEN indicated that the consolidation of UBL will have a small accretive effect on EPS (beia) and a dilutive effect on operating profit margin (beia).

We expect limited synergies from the integration of UBL into HEINEKEN. UBL has benefitted for many years of the know-how of HEINEKEN. In addition, our global suppliers have a limited presence in India. HEINEKEN will not provide a forward-looking statement on the operating profit margin in India.

4. Heineken has a number of notable low-margin countries in its global portfolio, among which Nigeria and South Africa. Can you share what Heineken foresees for these countries in terms of margins going forward, also in light of the announced acquisition of Heineken South Africa with Distell and Namibia Breweries?

In South Africa, our operating profit margins before the impact of the pandemic were held back by significant volume imported at high cost from the Netherlands and other countries to meet demand. We expect this to reduce as we have completed the expansion of Sedibeng. At the announcement of the Distell and Namibia Breweries proposed transaction, HEINEKEN stated that it expected it to be EPS accretive within one year and operating profit margin accretive over the medium term on realisation of significant synergies. In Nigeria, our operating profit margins have been impacted by high inflation the devaluation of the Naira, and massive downtrading of our portfolio from mainstream to economy brands. Given the increasing pressure from inflation in the market and further devaluation of the Naira, we have introduced more pricing to overcome these challenges and improve profitability. HEINEKEN will continue to address its value diluting operations, like it has restructured its business in the Philippines and Lebanon, whilst making steady progress towards sustained scale and profitability in recent market entries like Ecuador and Peru.

5. Heineken’s marketing and selling expenses, expressed as a percentage of net revenue, has declined over a number of This holding back on marketing spend might erode Heineken’s brand value. What will Heineken do to bring these investments back to a normalized level?

During the pandemic, HEINEKEN took significant short-term cost mitigation actions to mitigate the impact on its profitability, including the reduction of marketing and sales discretionary expenses. With EverGreen, HEINEKEN aims for superior and balanced growth with enhanced profitability, whilst simultaneously raising the bar on sustainability and responsibility. An essential part of this strategy is its growth algorithm, through which we drive continuous productivity improvements to be able to accelerate investments to drive further growth. Reinvesting in marketing and sales is a key component of these areas for further investments. At the same time, we continue to drive commercial productivity improvements, for example by increasing our consumer facing spend relative to the non- consumer facing expenses in marketing. We aim to get much more for every euro spend in marketing and sales going forward.

6. Heineken strives to reach a 17 percent operating profit margin (beia), whereby it recovers to the pre-coronapandemic level. Given the need to invest in marketing and sales, can you share whether there is potential margin upside in the medium- to long- term and thereby closing the gap with AB InBev?

HEINEKEN sees that there is margin upside relative to the level of 2021 from a number of areas. First there is the operating leverage that the recovery from COVID, particularly in Europe and Asia Pacific will bring. Second, our growth algorithm aims to gear our business for operating leverage beyond the COVID recovery, with superior top-line growth with balanced volume and value growth, continuous productivity improvements that will enable reinvestments, not only in marketing and sales, but also in digital transformation and our agenda on sustainability and responsible consumption. HEINEKEN monitors and benchmarks its relative profitability levels to other companies and addresses opportunities where it makes sense to do so, considering structural differences.

7. Heineken’s market value is in part derived from its partnership with China Resources Beer (CRB). Is Heineken able to share some details on the progress made with that partnership in recent years given the perceived large growth opportunity in China?

HEINEKEN is very satisfied with the progress that CRB is making with our brand portfolio and the Heineken® brand. In 2021, the Heineken® brand was close to 2x its pre-pandemic levels. China is now the fourth largest market for Heineken® globally. There is a strong and clear strategic alignment between CRB and HEINEKEN and that has contributed to the close collaboration we have observed these recent years.

Statement: Heineken’s LTIP is composed of financial metrics like organic revenue growth, net profit, and free cash flow. As a result, skimping on marketing and selling expenses might potentially be rewarded, which could be to the detriment of a company that is fully dependent on its brand value. To preserve and improve the brand portfolio, aligning the interests of investors and management, European Investors-VEB urges Heineken to consider introducing a gross profit metric - which explicitly excludes marketing and selling expenses - into its remuneration policy at the expense of metrics that do include marketing and selling expenses.

8. A decade ago Heineken used a gross profit metric in its remuneration policy. Does the supervisory board agree that adding gross profit to the LTI-performance plan metrics incentivizes management to improve pricing power?

The SB believes that the current set of metrics proposed to be included in the LTI provide the right balance for long-term value creation of all stakeholders of HEINEKEN, including top-line growth, profitability, capital efficiency and environmental and social sustainability.

9. Is Heineken willing to consider adding a gross profit margin target when reviewing the current remuneration policy?

HEINEKEN assesses every year its remuneration policy relative to current strategic direction and external developments, mindful also of the implications of changes. This naturally includes a review of our choice of metrics to for the LTI to ensure the best balance for long-term value creation.

1. De hoge prijzen en de Ukraine oorlog zorgen voor een hernieuwde belangstelling voor investeringen in olie en gas. Fugro zelf verwacht een “bescheiden groei” (blz. 41 jaarverslag) in nieuwe opdrachten voor olie en gas.

Waarom slechts een “bescheiden groei”, of stelt Fugro deze verwachting inmiddels naar boven bij gezien de ontwikkelingen?

2. Inflatie is stevig toegenomen en zou structureel op een hoger niveau kunnen komen.

a. Welke impact voorziet Fugro op de kosten van energie en personeel?

b. In welke mate verwacht Fugro dit via hogere prijzen te kunnen compenseren (in welke mate heeft Fugro pricing power)?

3. Biden wil groot investeren in de infrastructuur in de VS.

a. Zijn de eerste (potentiële) orders al in zicht voor Fugro?

b. Op welke termijn verwacht Fugro hier noemenswaardige impact op de omzet en winst?

4. Fugro geeft aan als de wereldleider in geo-data nummer 1 of 2 in de diverse markten te zijn. Bovendien heeft Fugro een minder gefragmenteerd dienstenpakket dan de meeste concurrenten en kan dus integrale oplossingen bieden (blz. 14 jaarverslag).

a. Je zou verwachten dat een dergelijke leiderschapspositie resulteert in extra hoge marges. Hoe verhouden de marges van Fugro zich tot de concurrentie?

b. Als de concurrenten veel lagere marges hebben, zouden ze grotendeels inmiddels op omvallen Als ze vergelijkbare of zelfs hogere marges hebben, dan rijst de vraag of de diensten van Fugro echt zo onderscheidend zijn en er dus weinig pricing power is. Hoe ziet Fugro dit?

5. De Europa-Afrika EBIT-marges zijn beduidend hoger dan de andere 3 regio’s (blz. 38-39 jaarverslag). Europa-Afrika behaalt 9,5% EBIT-marge bij 658M euro omzet, terwijl de andere 3 regio’s 0,0% EBIT-marge hebben bij 804M euro omzet.

a. Waarom beperkt Fugro zich niet tot Europa-Afrika?

b. Op welke termijn verwacht Fugro dat de andere 3 regio’s de winstgevendheid van Europa-Afrika bereiken?

6. Fugro lijkt na jaren tegenslag voorzichtig het pad naar winstgevende groei te hebben gevonden. Per eind 2021 staat maar liefst 260M euro (blz. 137) nog steeds als “unrecognized deferred tax losses”. Gezien de structureel verbeterende vooruitzichten, verwacht Fugro dat uiteindelijk een groot deel hiervan toch compensabel worden (waarmee toekomstige belastinguitgaven worden verminderd)?

7. De boekwaarde van de materiële vaste activa beloopt circa 26% van de Dit lijkt er op te duiden dat er sprake is van een investeringsachterstand. Heeft deze mogelijke achterstand invloed op de concurrentiepositie van Fugro c.q. hindert dit de onderneming in het verkrijgen van opdrachten?

8. Het bedrag aan nog te factureren op projecten is ultimo 2021 belangrijk toegenomen. Ook de gemiddelde incassotermijn van debiteuren is opgelopen. Is er sprake van een lossere werkkapitaalbeheersing?

9. De waardering van de tax assets is terecht een key audit matter. EY erkent dat dit een hoge mate van beoordelingsvermogen vergt (blz. 192). In het verleden was een pessimistische blik begrijpelijk, met een kritisch oog naar de recognized tax assets (te hoog?). Nu de resultaten verbeteren en de vooruitzichten zonniger zijn, zou je verwachten dat juist kritisch wordt gekeken naar de unrecognized tax assets (te hoog?). Voorziet EY een grote verschuiving in de komende jaren van unrecognized naar recognized tax assets?

10. De RvC draagt commissaris Campo voor herbenoeming met 2 jaar voor na een zittingsperiode van 8 jaar.

a. Qua hedendaagse governance wordt herbenoeming na 8 jaar slechts aanbevolen in uitzonderlijke Op welke uitzonderlijke omstandigheden beroept Fugro zich?

De VEB zal zich onthouden van stemmen, tenzij er een deugdelijke onderbouwing komt.

1. Galapagos gaat van een two tier naar one tier Waarom is besloten om de CEO ook voorzitter (chair) te maken i.p.v. een onafhankelijke chair? Uiteindelijk compenseert een lead non-executive director dit governance-manco maar gedeeltelijk.

2. Galapagos meldt dat ze dankzij haar wetenschappelijke expertise, sterk leiderschap en groeiende commerciële franchise (blz. 11 jaarverslag) de pijplijn verder zullen versterken. Het track record qua pijplijn is echter zeer teleurstellend, met diverse grote tegenslagen, en Onno van de Stolpe zal toch enigszins gedesillusioneerd met pensioen gaan.

a. Waar is dat optimisme op gebaseerd?

b. Hoe gaat Galapagos ervoor zorgen dat de investeringen echt gaan renderen?

c. Hoeveel jaren extra geduld vraagt Galapagos van de aandeelhouders alvorens de investeringen sinds de oprichting in economische zin gaan renderen?

d. Is Galapagos bereid om bij uitblijven van een deugdelijk en geloofwaardig plan te werken aan een gecontroleerde verkoop van de onderneming?

e. Wat maakt Galapagos echt uniek, waardoor er goede mogelijkheden zijn om veel meer rendement te behalen dan een gecontroleerde verkoop van de onderneming?

3. Jyseleca (filgotinib) is m. goedgekeurd in Europa tegen RA.

a. In hoeverre wordt de verkoop van Jyseleca tegen RA in Europa (reputationeel) belemmerd door het besluit van Gilead geen nieuwe aanvraag in te dienen voor goedkeuring in de VS?

b. In hoeverre verwacht Galapagos dat de (toekomstige) verkoop van Jyseleca/filgotinib (reputationeel) belemmerd wordt tegen andere ziektes (CY, CD, ...)?

c. Beschouwt Galapagos het besluit van Gilead als irrationeel?

4. De VEB betreurt dat er geen interactieve webcast van de aandeelhoudersvergadering is (en zelfs helemaal geen webcast).

a. Waarom faciliteert Galapagos geen interactieve webcast?

b. Hoe valt dit te rijmen met een goede governance richting aandeelhouders?

c. Erkent Galapagos dat deze keuze extra knelt gezien de COVID-beperkingen die Galapagos nota bene zelf noemt?

5. Galapagos meldt dat er sprake was van een geplande pensionering van Onno van de Stolpe (blz. 7 jaarverslag).

a. Zijn de eerdere berichten dat Onno van de Stolpe (vrijwillig) vertrekt door de aanhoudende stroom van tegenslagen, onjuist?

6. Onno van de Stolpe was als oprichter al sinds 1999 Tegelijkertijd was Rajesh Parekh al sinds 2004 voorzitter van de Raad van Toezicht.

a. Erkent Galapagos dat een dergelijke lange termijn voor een CEO in de meeste gevallen - zeker uit governance perspectief - onverstandig is?

b. Erkent Galapagos dat een dergelijke lange termijn voor een voorzitter van de Raad van Toezicht in alle gevallen - en in ieder geval vanuit governance perspectief - onverstandig is?

c. Erkent Galapagos dat de combinatie van zowel een CEO als een voorzitter van de Raad van Toezicht die zeer lang aanblijven onverantwoord - en vanuit governance perspectief zelfs onacceptabel - is?

7. De CEO en andere leden van de directieraad ontvangen ook een variabele beloning.

a. Waarom oordeelt de Raad van Toezicht dat er sprake kan zijn van enige variabele beloningen, terwijl er diverse fundamentele tegenslagen zijn geweest?

b. Waarom heeft de Raad van Toezicht haar discretionaire bevoegdheid niet gebruikt om uitsluitend de vaste salarissen (en andere vaste zaken als pensioen) te betalen?

8. Piet Wigerink (CSO) ontvangt een vertrekvergoeding (blz. 168). Is Piet Wigerink uit eigen beweging vertrokken en zo ja, waarom krijgt hij dan toch een vertrekvergoeding?

9. Onne van de Stolpe (CEO) ontvangt een vertrekvergoeding (blz. 168). Is Onno van de Stolpe uit eigen beweging vertrokken en zo ja, waarom krijgt hij dan toch een vertrekvergoeding?

10. VEB is ongelukkig met de welkomstbonus voor Paul Stoffels van 1 miljoen aandelen die tegen € 50 kunnen worden gekocht.

a. Vindt de Raad van Toezicht niet dat een vast basissalaris met daarbovenop een variabele beloning die kan worden toegekend na behalen van uitdagende targets, voldoende zouden moeten zijn om een gemotiveerde en competente bestuurder aan te trekken?

b. Wat heeft de Raad van Toezicht doen besluiten om toch een welkomstbonus toe te kennen?

c. Zou Paul Stoffels anders de positie hebben geweigerd?

1.Unilever has long advocated a disciplined approach to capital allocation. How can this be reconciled with Unilever’s interest in GSK Consumer Healthcare?

2.At the FY 2021 results presentation Unilever emphasized its confidence in the (accelerated) organic growth potential of its brands. How does this compare to Unilever’s initial willingness to pursue a sizeable M&A deal at a high valuation multiple with significantly less value creation potential?

3.How did Unilever’s interest in GSK Consumer Healthcare compare to its multi-year financial framework of long term value creation and a mid-to-high teens ROIC-level?

4.Why would a shift into consumer health with an acquisition of GSK Consumer Healthcare ‘position Unilever for faster growth in the decades to come’ - as stated during the FY 2021 analyst presentation - as compared to emphasizing organic growth?

5.CEO Alan Jope recently commented that he was ‘dissatisfied with the recent value creation that Unilever has delivered’ for its investors. What is the root cause analysis behind this statement?

6.Was Unilever surprised by the negative feedback of shareholders and analysts following its intention to acquire GSK Consumer Health?

7.Did shareholders signal a loss of confidence in Unilever’s management and/or non-executive directors during engagement sessions following the shown interest in GSK Consumer Healthcare?

8.Over the last few quarters Unilever implemented significant price increases. Pricing was up to an unprecedented level of 8.3% in Q1 2022, with volumes slightly declining. Unilever expects a low single digit volume decline going forward. What gives Unilever the confidence that volumes will not decline further considering the ongoing aggressive pricing and competitive landscape?

9.Is it realistic to assume that Unilever’s competitiveness (as measured by its ‘% Business Winning Market Share’ metric) will improve considering the accelerated pricing initiatives?

10.The Audit Committee Report refers to risk management and internal control. In this regard it mentions that ‘the key area of focus has been to ensure that controls impacted by the transformation programmes are appropriately designed and are being implemented effectively’.

a.What changes with respect to the risk management and internal control procedures have been implemented to date to accommodate the new organisational model?

b.What actions are still to be effectuated in this regard?
 
11.The Remuneration Committee commented that ‘the final outcomes of 81% of target for annual bonus and 87% of target for MCIP are below our expectations’. Is this to say that Unilever’s performance in 2021 as well as over the 2018 - 2021 cycle was below its own forecasts?

Since the announcement of the first provision for the sleep devices recall on 26 April 2021, Philips’ shares dropped almost 50 percent, wiping out over 20 billion euros of market value.

Over this period, the provision for the product recall was increased in three steps from 250 million euros to almost 900 million euros at the Q1 2022 results presentation. Disappointments accumulated over this period. Among others, the FDA made severe observations about the inadequate functioning of quality control systems in a Respironics factory. More recently, according to the FDA, the communication of Philips concerning the recall was considered subpar. On 25 April Philips disclosed having received a Department of Justice subpoena for information related to the recall of Respironics respiratory devices. Also, ahead of the full-year results, Philips issued a profit warning.

Philips’ management doesn’t appear to be “in control”, resulting in a total loss of investor confidence in the company. Also, the VEB questions, if Philips has adequately disclosed all the relevant information about (potential) problems with the sleep devices in a timely manner with financial markets as soon as it became aware of these facts.

VEB will express its dissatisfaction by voting against eight items on the AGM-agenda (see table).

agenda item	proposal	VEB vote	explanation
2.d	remuneration report	against	improper use of discretionary powers to adjust variable remuneration upwards
2.e	discharge management board	against	management not in control, subpar quality control systems and lackluster communication
2.f	discharge supervisory board	against	Insufficient fulfillment of supervisory duties
3.a	re-appointment Paul Stoffels	against	chairman of remco and responsible for remuneration practices
3.b	re-appointment Marc Harrison	against	member of the Quality & Regulatory Committee
3.c	appointment Herna Verhagen	against	too many other mandates (CEO PostNL and SB-member ING)
5.a/b	issue shares and exclude pre-emption rights	against	at the current depressed share price it is value destructive to issue new shares

1. The optimistic tone of Philips on the recall during consecutive presentations of the financial results as well as in the media since April last year is difficult to reconcile with the severe observations made in the inspection report of the FDA.

a. How does Philips explain this discrepancy?

b. Should investors be concerned that it will turn out that Philips downplayed the problems with its sleep devices?

2. The inspection report of the FDA explicitly states that Philips was, or should have been, aware of the problems with its sleep devices much earlier than April last year.

a. At what specific date was the management board of Philips aware of the issues with the devices?

b. In the FDA report, the observation is made that management of Respironics was aware of the issues since at least 31 January 2020, or earlier. Is the conclusion fair that Respironics did not adequately and timely inform Philips’ management?

c. At what point should Philips’ management board reasonably have been informed about the issues with the devices?

3. The provision concerning the product recall was increased in three steps from 250 million euros on 26 April 2021 to almost 900 million euros in total at the Q1 2022 results.

a. How could Philips be so wrong in its judgement and estimate of the provision?

b. Are these misestimates and gradual increases indications that Philips’ management is not in control?

c. How confident is Philips that the current provision is sufficient?

4. Philips’ most prominent competitor in sleep care, Resmed, is very outspoken about the company’s Resmed recently mentioned that it is unlikely Philips’ market share will be restored. Resmed also noted Philips will probably not be fully back in the sleep care market before March or even June 2023.

a. Should investors be concerned that (dissatisfied) patients stop using Philips devices and permanently switch to competitor's products?

b. What is the likelihood that a customer that switched to the competitor will come back to Philips when the issues are solved?

c. How confident is Philips that it will be able to restore its market shares, and could it give an indication of the timeline?

d. Could Philips indicate when the sleep business will be fully operational again?

5. Management acknowledged multiple headwinds in the presentation of the Q1 2022 results, such as the China lockdowns, supply chain issues, and the Ukraine Yet, Philips reiterated its full-year financial guidance. Why does Philips believe the 2022 guidance is still realistic given the company-specific issues as well as the macro-climate?

6. It is mentioned in the 2021 annual report that the Supervisory Board performed a self- evaluation. Several suggestions were made to further strengthen the Supervisory Board going Among others, the following topics were mentioned: ‘the key regulatory regimes applicable to the company’, ‘manufacturing and suppliers (including in the context of quality and patient safety)’, and ‘the overall control structure and reporting lines’.

a. In the 2020 annual report, however, not one topic that came out of the self- evaluation was related to quality controls, regulatory regimes, or patient Is it fair to say the Supervisory Board was surprised by the malfunctioning of Philips’ quality systems?

b. In the 2020 annual report it is stated ‘the functioning of the Supervisory Board committees was rated highly’. How does the Supervisory Board rate its own functioning in 2021?

7. The input variables used for the annual impairment test for the Sleep & Respiratory Care cash-generating unit have been adjusted compared to the variables used during the half- year results (when there was a triggering event).

Cash generating unit: Sleep & Respiratory Care

a. How could management justify the change in assumption for sales growth in the initial forecast period (first three years of the model) of minus 4,8 percent in the 2021 half-year results to the 9.2 percent used in the most recent impairment test?

b. How does a growth rate assumption of 2 percent compare to an analyst consensus growth rate of 2.9 percent for the period 2022-2024 for the segment Connected Care?

c. The valuation of goodwill for the CGU Sleep & Respiratory Care is a key audit A key observation of EY is that – in short – the management assumptions and estimates are ‘considered reasonable’. Why does EY believe a 9.2 percent growth rate in the initial forecast period is reasonable and not aggressive?

Explanation of vote: VEB will vote against the remuneration report. The reason for this vote is that we believe the discretionary adjustments by Remco to facilitate a higher LTI and STI payout are ill-explained and inappropriate given Philips’ financial results and the massive decline of its share price. We also believe the reasoning behind the adjustments for ‘specific unexpected events that were outside of management’s control’ is flawed. While we acknowledge that global constraints in supply chains are an issue for most companies, we believe that Philips should have taken more proactive action to secure its supply chain. More in general, we believe it is inappropriate to upwardly adjust bonuses as the FDA and potential DOJ investigation are ongoing and the outcomes are uncertain. If any, Remco should have used its discretionary powers to adjust bonuses downward. After careful consideration, the VEB votes against the remuneration report. Nevertheless, we have the following questions.

8. In an interview with Belgian financial daily De Tijd dated 5 February 2022 Van Houten stated that Philips ‘is making more long-term agreements with our suppliers, in order to try to build in a little more certainty’.

a. How does this statement reconcile with Remco's view that supply chain issues are beyond management control?

b. Shouldn't Philips have taken a more proactive approach to securing its supplies and build in more certainty at an earlier stage?

c. The adjustments made by Remco with respect to the supply chain disruptions are different for the STI (50 percent of delayed sales were added back in the calculation) and the LTI (75 percent of sales). This gives the impression that this was an arbitrary process. Could Remco explain the substantial difference in adjustments for the LTI versus the STI?

9. The remuneration report states that the adjustments made for the 2021 variable pay are taken into account when setting the target levels for the STI targets for 2022.

a. Could Remco disclose the threshold, at target and maximum levels with respect to the three financial STI-targets for 2022 (profit margin, revenue growth and cash flow)?

b. Does Remco believe the targets are ambitious enough?

 

1. Trade payables as percentage of costs of goods sold have increased significantly over the past few years.

a. Did JDE Peet’s have to make price concessions to its suppliers in order to stretch payables to the current levels?

b. Does the company consider this increase sustainable in the longer run, or will payables revert back to historical - lower - levels?

2. The number of stores in China has almost doubled last year. How does the company envision the growth path in 2022 and beyond, and is Covid-19 a factor that hampers rolling out new stores, thereby preventing a critical mass?

3. JDE Peet’s has indicated that price fluctuations of green beans are transferred to the shelfs with some time-delay. However, the company also states that it has increased prices pro-actively. Does the company see any volume-impact from these increases so far?

4. JDE Peet’s has indicated that deleveraging remains a priority. Given the fact that the desired ratio, measured by net debt to adjusted ebitda, stood at 7x at the end of FY21, the ‘optimal leverage ratio’ of 2.5x is within reach. How does this change the company’s capital allocation priorities?

5. Previously, shareholder remuneration appeared to focus on dividends above share repurchases. However, during the annual results’ presentation the CEO referred to share repurchases.

a. Could the company indicate under what conditions it prefers share repurchases to dividends?

b. How does the company envision the use of buybacks given the low free-float of just over 22 percent?

6. As a pure play coffee & tea company, JDE Peet’s has an increased focus to the market compared to competitors, but lacks the financial leeway of larger conglomerates when it comes to consolidation efforts. How does the company intend to mitigate this potential weakness in a consolidating and profitable market?

7. Like previous year, the remuneration report only provides high-level information. It merely discloses a total multiplier for the short- and long-term remuneration.

a. Why has the company opted to leave out even the relative weights of the determinants of the short- and long-term incentive multipliers?

b. Why doesn’t JDE Peet’s disclose how actual performance compared to target for each of the three STI performance measures?

8. For the LTI, the remuneration report provides even less information than for the STI. JDE Peet’s only reports that the maximum pay-out of 500 percent was achieved. Could you elaborate on how this pay-out was determined? In our view, the remuneration report could benefit from an additional explanation on how exactly the Supervisory Board determined this pay-out.

Statement on the remuneration report: VEB remarks there is room for improvement regarding the disclosure in the remuneration report, specifically regarding the disclosure of the actual performance and the threshold, target and above target levels for the STI (preferably ex-ante but at least ex-post). The argument that increased disclosure might harm JDE Peet’s competitive position is, in our opinion, not convincing, as the remuneration policy mainly includes high-level targets. For the above-stated reasons, VEB votes against the remuneration report.

9. The Audit Committee reports that ‘the completion of design and implementation of the controls at Peet’s were discussed’. Could the Audit Committee indicate which measures have been taken to bolster the internal controls, and if any, this resulted in insights previously unknown?

10. Three new non-executive board members are nominated for appointment. Can JDE Peet’s confirm that these non-executive directors will not be awarded shares or restricted share units for their services, next to their annual base salary?

11. Ana Garcia Fau holds directorships in at least three other listed companies. In addition, her resume contains a non-executive chairpersonship at Finerge SA, as well as a number of advisory board memberships. How will she allocate her time to JDE Peet’s?

1. Comptoir & Clos SAS is in de jaarrekening van B&S als deelneming Blijkens opeenvolgende jaarrekeningen is die vennootschap sinds ultimo 2019 in liquidatie.
Translated: Comptoir & Clos SAS is accounted for as an associate in B&S's financial statements. According to successive financial statements, that company has been in liquidation since year-end 2019.

a. Wat is de reden dat deze deelneming in het verleden in de jaarrekening van B&S terecht is gekomen?
Translated: What is the reason that this associate has historically appeared in B&S's financial statements?

Answer: It was an associate of a company we acquired in the past.

b. Is er een relatie tussen Comptoir & Clos SAS en het zakelijke conflict tussen Willem Blijdorp en Franck Peyrard waarover NRC op 8 maart jl. publiceerde (‘Diefstal, bedreiging, geruïneerde zakenpartners: de twee gezichten van Willem Blijdorp’)? Zo ja, wat is die relatie op dit moment?
Translated: Is there a relationship between Comptoir & Clos SAS and the business conflict between Willem Blijdorp and Franck Peyrard about which NRC published on March 8 ('Theft, threats, ruined business partners: the two faces of Willem Blijdorp')? If so, what is that relationship at the moment?

Answer: B&S holds 50% of the shares in Comptoir & Clos SAS. Franck Peyrard is the other 50% shareholder in this company.

c. Om welke redenen is de liquidatie nog altijd niet afgewikkeld?
Translated: For what reasons has the liquidation still not been settled?

Answer: The liquidation process in France is time consuming. B&S is awaiting the liquidator’s next steps

2. Op 8 april maakte B&S door middel van een persbericht de overname bekend van een 70 procent belang van een niet nader genoemd Frans bedrijf. In dat persbericht was ook de overnamesom niet vermeld.
Translated: On April 8, B&S announced by means of a press release the acquisition of a 70 percent stake in an undisclosed French company. That press release also did not mention the acquisition price.

a. Waarom wil B&S die voor aandeelhouders relevante informatie niet prijsgeven?
Translated: Why won't B&S disclose that relevant information to shareholders?

Answer: We have not published the name of the acquired company because we do not consider this to be relevant information, given the limited size of the company. The purchase price for this acquisition was EUR 17.5 million.

b. Wie was de verkopende partij?
Translated: Who was the selling party?

Answer: The founders of the French company.

c. B&S heeft het recht om over drie jaar haar belang met nog eens 15% uit te breiden. Op welke wijze zal de voor dat belang te betalen prijs worden vastgesteld?
Translated: B&S has the right to increase its interest by another 15% in three years. How will the price to be paid for that interest be determined?

Answer: This will be based on a pre-determined multiplier times the EBITDA at that moment minus the net debt.

d. Is het correct dat B&S geen groter belang dan 85 procent beoogt?
Translated: Is it correct that B&S does not intend a greater interest than 85 percent?

Answer: The remaining shares are held by the managing directors of the acquired company. Because we wish to keep these directors incentivized, we currently have no intention to acquire the remaining 15%.

3. In het verslag van de Audit and Risk Committee (ARC) wordt gesproken over ‘verbeterde procedures rond related party transactions’. Kan de Raad van Commissarissen (RvC) een betekenisvolle toelichting geven op wat die verbeteringen behelsen?
Translated: The report of the Audit and Risk Committee (ARC) mentions 'improved procedures around related party transactions'. Can the Supervisory Board (SB) provide a meaningful explanation of what those improvements entail?

Answer: Transactions with related parties are subject to strict internal procedures, including an assessment if the transaction is entered into at arm’s length prior to the entering into the transaction. Authorization levels depend on the type and size of the transactions. Substantial transactions require the prior approval of the Supervisory Board.

4. Leendert Blijdorp werd in de AvA 2021 benoemd tot Sindsdien is hij tevens voorzitter van de ARC binnen de RvC. Vindt de RvC het van goede corporate governance getuigen dat Leendert Blijdorp in zijn rol van voorzitter van de ARC een bijzondere verantwoordelijkheid heeft bij het beoordelen en challengen van transacties die B&S aangaat met aan zijn vader gelieerde partijen?
Translated: Leendert Blijdorp was appointed to the Supervisory Board at the 2021 AGM. Since then he has also been chairman of the ARC within the SB. Does the SB consider it good corporate governance that Leendert Blijdorp, in his role as Chairman of the ARC, has a special responsibility in reviewing and challenging transactions that B&S enters into with parties related to his father?

Answer: The primary responsibility of entering into related party transactions and determining the arm’s length basis is with the Executive Board. The Audit Committee has a supervisory role. The Executive Board, the Audit Committee and the Supervisory Board as a whole will ensure that the appropriate checks and balances are in place in respect of the assessment of related party transactions.

5. Commissaris Kitty Koelemeijer is als hoogleraar Marketing verbonden aan de Nyenrode Business Universiteit (Nyenrode). Willem Blijdorp kreeg vorig jaar van Nyenrode een eredoctoraat Volgens de website van Nyenrode sprak Koelemeijer de lofrede uit voor Blijdorp. Is Koelemeijer vanwege deze omstandigheid nog wel in staat om onafhankelijk toezicht te houden bij B&S?
Translated: Supervisory Board Member Kitty Koelemeijer is a Professor of Marketing at Nyenrode Business University (Nyenrode). Willem Blijdorp was awarded an honorary doctorate by Nyenrode last year. According to the website of Nyenrode, Koelemeijer delivered the eulogy for Blijdorp. Because of this circumstance, is Koelemeijer still able to provide independent supervision at B&S?

Answer: The Supervisory Board supervises the Executive Board. Willem Blijdorp is not a member of the Executive Board. In our view, Ms Koelemeijer's role within Nyenrode does not prejudice her capacity to act as an independent supervisory board member of B&S. The awarding was a collective and independent decision of the Nyenrode faculty.

6. Uit de jaarrekening blijkt dat B&S in 2021 een bedrag van 12,1 miljoen euro heeft verantwoord voor door verbonden partijen aan B&S geleverde producten en diensten.
Translated: The financial statements show that in 2021, B&S recognized an amount of 12.1 million euros for products and services provided to B&S by related parties.

a. Om welke producten en diensten ging dit, en waarom fluctueert deze post door de jaren heen sterk?
Translated: What products and services did this involve, and why does this item fluctuate greatly over the years?

Answer: This mainly concerns the purchase of inventory. The fluctuation is related to availability in the market and the price level.

b. Wat is de zakelijke rationale van deze transacties?
Translated: What is the business rationale for these transactions?

Answer: These products and services were valuable additions to B&S's portfolio, and these transactions enabled B&S to purchase these items at arm's length yet competitive terms and conditions.

c. Welke vennootschappen waren bij deze transacties de tegenpartij?
Translated: Which companies were the counterparties in these transactions?

Answer: This mainly concerned entities held by our majority shareholder.

d. Hoe is gewaarborgd dat de bij deze transacties betrokken externe partijen niet zijn bevoordeeld?
Translated: How is it ensured that the external parties involved in these transactions have not been advantaged?

Answer: This is ensured through the procedures for related party transactions as explained in the answer to question 3.

7. B&S rapporteert een kasuitstroom van ongeveer 12 miljoen euro vanwege dividendbetalingen aan minderheidsbelangen. In 2020 ging het om licht hogere dividendbetalingen. Afgezet tegen het aandeel in de winst van die minderheidsbelangen was het uitkeringspercentage liefst 75 procent.
Translated: B&S reports a cash outflow of about 12 million euros due to dividend payments to minority interests. In 2020, these were slightly higher dividend payments. Measured against the profit share of those minority interests, the payout rate was 75 percent.

a. Hoe kunnen deze ogenschijnlijk hoge dividendbetalingen verklaard worden?
Translated: How are these seemingly high dividend payments explained?

Answer: The purpose of the dividend payments was to upstream cash from various group companies to B&S Group in order to be able to use this cash for group purposes. Any holders of minority interests in those companies also received a portion of these dividend payments.

b. Kan B&S aangeven welke vennootschap in 2020 en 2021 verantwoordelijk was voor de hoogste afzonderlijke dividendbetaling? Om welk bedrag ging dit?
Translated: Can B&S indicate what company in 2020 and 2021 was responsible for the highest individual dividend payment? What was the amount?

Answer: B&S does not discuss individual dividend payments, as it generally does not consider this to be relevant information. The amount of dividend paid is determined based on a combination of net result, cash available and expected cash requirements.

8. In 2020 heeft B&S de resterende 49 procent van de aandelen overgenomen in STG Holding Import-Export S.L. (hierna: ‘STG Holding’). Die aandelen waren van een verbonden partij verkregen.
Translated: In 2020 B&S acquired the remaining 49% of the shares of STG Holding Import-Export S.L. (hereafter: ‘STG Holding’). These shares were acquired from a related party.

a. Wie was deze verbonden partij?
Translated: Who was this related party?

Answer: A company ultimately held by one of the managing directors of STG Holding.

b. Wat was de reden voor de aanschaf van deze aandelen door B&S?
Translated: What was the reason for the acquisition of these shares by B&S?

Answer: Further integration of the company into our business.

c. Hoe is de overnamesom van 1,5 miljoen euro bepaald?
Translated: How was the purchase price of 1.5 million euro determined?

Answer: Based on past performance of the company and expected future developments.

d. Kan B&S een toelichting geven op de financiёle gang van zaken bij STG Holding over de boekjaren 2018 t/m 2021 en daarbij in ieder geval ingaan op de omzetontwikkeling, het operationeel resultaat, het nettoresultaat en de balansverhoudingen?
Translated: Can B&S provide an explanation on the financial performance of STG Holding for the financial years 2018 through 2021, including in any case the development of turnover, the operating result, the net result and the balance sheet ratios?

Answer: STG Holding has been included in our consolidated financial statements since the acquisition of the first 51% from 2017 onwards. The company is part of our liquor segment, with its main activities in Spain. The performance of STG Holding has been lagging [since 2020] due to lower tourist volumes in Spain in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic.

e. Was B&S voorafgaand aan de verkrijging van de resterende 49 procent leningverstrekker aan STG Holding? Zo ja, wat was op dat moment de openstaande schuld aan B&S?
Translated: Was B&S prior to the acquisition of the remaining 49% a lender to STG Holding? If so, what was the outstanding debt towards B&S at that moment?

Answer: In the past, B&S has provided debt financing to STG Holding. However, STG Holding is now financed through its own means of financing.

9. Wat is de relatie tussen STG Holding en het als deelneming verantwoorde STG Logistica Y Depositos S.L.?
Translated: What is the relation between STG Holding and the company reported as subsidiary STG Logistica Y Depositos S.L.?

Answer: STG Logistica is a logistics company providing warehousing services for STG Holding.

10. Wie is (zijn) de overige aandeelhouder(s) van STG Logistica Y Depositos L.?
Translated: Who is (are) the other shareholder(s) of STG Logistica Y Depositos S.L.?

Answer: The sole other shareholder of STG Logistica Y Depositos S.L. is the previous owner of STG Holding (see question 8a).

11. Was het door Deloitte van B&S ontvangen overzicht van transacties met verbonden partijen telkens volledig?
Translated: Was the overview of related party transactions received by Deloitte from B&S always complete?

Answer: Please refer to the audit report dated March 2, 2022 of Deloitte Audit S.à r.l. (“Deloitte”) on the audit of the consolidated financial statements of B&S Group S.A. and its subsidiaries (the “B&S Group”) on page 180 to 184 of the annual report which includes the Opinion, Basis for Opinion, Key Audit Matters (including the Key Audit Matter about Related party transactions), Responsibilities of the Executive Board of Directors and Those Charged with Governance of the Group for the consolidated financial statements, and Responsibilities of the “réviseur d'entreprises agréé” for the Audit of the consolidated financial statements.

The Key Audit Matter about Related party transactions describes why Deloitte considered the Related party transactions to be a Key Audit Matter and how the Key Audit Matter was addressed in the audit. As also described in the Key Audit Matters section, these Key Audit Matters were addressed in the context of the audit of the consolidated financial statements as a whole, and in forming the opinion thereon, and Deloitte does not provide a separate opinion on these Key Audit Matters.

12. Heeft Deloitte tijdens de controle signalen ontvangen dat de verstrekte informatie door B&S over gelieerde partijen, een transactie of een relatie met gelieerde partijen niet volledig was?
Translated: During the audit, did Deloitte receive any indications that the information provided by B&S about affiliates, a transaction or a relationship with affiliates was incomplete?

Answer: Please refer to the response to question number 11.

13. Welke werkzaamheden heeft Deloitte verricht om daarover volledige zekerheid te verkrijgen?
Translated: What work has Deloitte performed to obtain full assurance on this?

Answer: Please refer to the response to question number 11.

14. Welke ‘input van specialisten’ heeft Deloitte gebruikt om verbonden partijen te identificeren? Hoe zijn die ‘specialisten’ te werk gegaan, en wat waren hun conclusies?
Translated: What ‘input from specialists’ has Deloitte used to identify related parties? How did those ‘specialists’ proceed, and what were their conclusions?

Answer: Please refer to the response to question number 11.

15. Is volgens Deloitte bij alle transacties sprake geweest van een marktconforme (‘at arm’s length’) transactie?
Translated: According to Deloitte, have all transactions been a transaction that is in line with the market ('at arm's length')?

Answer: Please refer to the response to question number 11.

16. Kan Deloitte een toelichting geven op de uitgevoerde controlewerkzaamheden rond de interne controle bij B&S in het kader van transacties met verbonden partijen?
Translated: Can Deloitte explain the audit procedures performed on internal control at B&S in the context of related party transactions?

Answer: Please refer to the response to question number 11.

17. Waarom heeft Deloitte geen aanleiding gezien om bijvoorbeeld Corporate Governance als aanvullende key audit matter te identificeren, gelet op het feit dat de controlerende aandeelhouder de besluitvorming binnen B&S feitelijk domineert?
Translated: Why has Deloitte not seen any reason to identify, for example, Corporate Governance as an additional Key Audit Matter, given the fact that the controlling shareholder actually dominates decision-making within B&S?

Answer: Please refer to the response to question number 11.

Agendapunt 4a. Decharge Raad van Bestuur Agendapunt 4b. Decharge Raad van Commissarissen Stemverklaring De VEB zal zich bij beide agendapunten onthouden van stemming. Bij het bepalen van haar stemgedrag heeft de VEB onder andere de transacties met gelieerde partijen meegewogen. Agendapunt 8a. herbenoeming van de heer J.A. van Barneveld Agendapunt 8b. herbenoeming van de heer W. Blijdorp Stemverklaring De VEB zal bij beide agendapunten een stem tegen uitbrengen. Voor wat betreft de voorgenomen herbenoeming van Van Barneveld merkt de VEB op dat onvoldoende is gebleken dat sprake is geweest van adequaat onafhankelijk toezicht. Zo is onder zijn voorzitterschap al geruime tijd sprake van een niet evenwichtig samengestelde RvC. Drie van de vijf commissarissen kwalificeren als niet-onafhankelijk, waarbij bovendien tussen twee commissarissen een familieband bestaat. De voor die onevenwichtige samenstelling door B&S gegeven uitleg overtuigt niet. Ten aanzien van de voorgenomen herbenoeming van Blijdorp (oprichter, controlerend aandeelhouder en vice-voorzitter van de RvC) constateert de VEB dat een herbenoeming van Blijdorp in strijd is met de Nederlandse corporate governance code (Code). Blijdorp is sinds 2004 commissaris en overschrijdt ruimschoots de maximale zittingsperiode die de Code voorschrijft. De voor deze afwijking gegeven uitleg is onzes inziens onvoldoende. Ook zijn als gevolg van recente publicaties twijfels ontstaan of aanhoudende bemoeienis van Blijdorp bij B&S vanuit reputationeel oogpunt wenselijk is.

Compensation
By way of an introductory comment, we would attract attention to footnote 8 of your 2021 Universa! Registration Document (on page 119 thereof):

'lt is stipulated that, pursuant to the European Commission's decision of April 5, 2021 on case No. SA.59913 relating to the recapitalization of Air France and Air France - KLM, no long-term variable compensation may be paid to the Chief Executive Officer until such time as at least 75% of the recapitalization measures hos been repaid. Discussions are currently under way between Air France - KLM and the European Commission concerning the scope of application of these restrictions.'

VEB cannot conceal its surprise -whereas there doesn't appear to be much room for doubt, it looks as if AF KLM puts the scope of application of the restrictions up for lack of clarity.

1. AF KLM notes that discussions are currently ongoing between AF KLM and the European Commission regarding the restrictions on corporate officers' remuneration.

Furthermore, the Universa! Registration Document mentions that the remuneration policy for the CEO, concerning his variabie remuneration, could change based on the outcome of these discussions.

a. What is the current status of these discussions?

b. What is meant exactly by: 'concerning the scope of app/ication of these restrictions'?

c. In the Universa! Registration Document it is mentioned that 'the remuneration po/icy of the CEO, as regards his variable remuneration, cou/d change based on the outcome of these discussions'.

-Could you elaborate on this statement?

-Does this 'change' refer to a scenario in which CEO Smith will become entitled (unconditional vesting) to the shares that have been conditionally granted for financial years 2020 and 20217

d. What does AF KLM consider to be a satisfactory outcome of these discussions?

Capitalisation
2. AF KLM reported negative equity as per Ql 2022 of € -/- 4.2 bn. According to French law (l'article 225-248 du Code de Commerce), a company is not allowed to report negative equity for more than two years. As per HY 2020 equity turned negative (€ -/- 2.6 bn.) for the first time.

Is it realistic to assume that AF KLM is able to report positive equity as per YE 2022?

3. In March 2020 the European Commission adopted the Temporary Framework to support companies facing the consequences of the public health crisis. Within this framework, recapitalisation measures by Member States will be authorised until June 30, 2022. Does this mean that a new round of recapitalisation of AF KLM should occur in any way before 30 June 2022?

4. At the Ql 2022 results' presentation, management said it is confident that AF KLM should be able to restore equity 'by ourse/ves just by performance of the business'. What time frame did management take into consideration when making this statement?

5. Does this imply that AF KLM excludes any ether measures, i.e. ether than operational performance, for strengthening the balance sheet?

6. Why would company performance alone suffice to restore equity, considering the fact that the company posted losses in Ql 2022 of€0.5 bn. and pre-Covid 19 net income was on average (financial years 2017 - 2019) less than €400 mln.?

7. Could management clarify why it is confident that 'the so/utions in place' - as stated during the Ql 2022 results' presentation - will enable a positive equity position? And within what time frame?

Question for the attention of the statutory audltors KPMG Audit and Deloitte & Associés
Above anything else, the primary preoccupation ought to be AF KLM's capitalisation. Directly connected to this is the looming question over AF KLM's overall viability; will it survive?

Not to mince our words, the question may well be how realistic AF KLM's prospects are for the plan to raise up to €4 billion. We note that, at the moment we write this letter, there appears to be no signal whatsoever on the project's realisation. You must be aware that the media have mooted that a failure to get this programme concretely on the road ahead of this shareholders' meeting will be read as a sign of failure. There is, thus, ample cause for concern. As the statutory auditors, you have acceded to AF KLM's going concern premise. Of course, we note that you did consider the impact of the health crisis on liquidity and going concern as a key audit matter.

Hence, we should, mindful of the French adage /rapper toujours, nonetheless ask you to expand on why you have stopped short of rejecting the company's going concern assumption.

Finally, VEB wish to reiterate its preference for pertinent matters actually being discussed and, where called for, debated, at the physical shareholders' meeting. To VEB, this is an aspect of corporate governance. Hence, we should indeed welcome discussing your replies to our questions at the forthcoming meeting.